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-rw-r--r--simpleperf/main.cpp6
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/simpleperf/main.cpp b/simpleperf/main.cpp
index 21c5351e..49d25481 100644
--- a/simpleperf/main.cpp
+++ b/simpleperf/main.cpp
@@ -21,19 +21,17 @@
#include "command.h"
#include "environment.h"
-using namespace simpleperf;
-
#if defined(__ANDROID__)
bool AndroidSecurityCheck() {
// Simpleperf can be executed by the shell, or by apps themselves. To avoid malicious apps
// exploiting perf_event_open interface via simpleperf, simpleperf needs proof that the user
// is expecting simpleperf to be ran:
- // 1) On Android < R, perf_event_open is secured by perf_event_allow_path, which is controlled
+ // 1) On Android < R, perf_event_open is secured by perf_event_paranoid, which is controlled
// by security.perf_harden property. perf_event_open syscall can be used only after user setting
// security.perf_harden to 0 in shell. So we don't need to check security.perf_harden explicitly.
// 2) On Android R, perf_event_open may be controlled by selinux instead of
- // perf_event_allow_path. So we need to check security.perf_harden explicitly. If simpleperf is
+ // perf_event_paranoid. So we need to check security.perf_harden explicitly. If simpleperf is
// running via shell, we already know the origin of the request is the user, so set the property
// ourselves for convenience. When started by the app, we won't have the permission to set the
// property, so the user will need to prove this intent by setting it manually via shell.